Oleg Orlov Sums Up the Discussion

OLEG ORLOV: Thank you, that means we have come to the end of the first part of our round table. All of those who had been invited to speak did so for about 10 minutes. Before we begin the second part of our evening we’ll have a 15 minute coffee break, but right now, as the moderator, I’ll allow myself to summarise and outline the differences which emerged in the discussions. It is possible I didn’t hear something, missed something important or wrongly interpreted something. I do not claim to know the ultimate truth. I am just highlighting a few points of divergence.

Everyone agreed on one thing. There are prisoners of conscience. The classic definition is that of “people, convicted in relation to the non-violent expression of their views, convicted on the basis of no relation to the discrimination of such expression, or in connection with the realisation of their legal rights.” However, they are not accused of committing offences of a different nature. Either these are people, judged for their affiliation to an ethnic, religious, professional or other group. These are prisoners of conscience. Quite clearly these are innocent people, unlawfully judged and in violation of their rights, as defined by the Constitution and international law.

Second of all, we have our first point of divergence. What are political prisoners? Sergey Davidis stated his opinion, which is based on two points. On the one hand, there is a political motive behind the authorities’ actions, on the other hand, there are significant violations during the investigation and trial which influenced their outcome. A person is subsequently convicted. This is the first definition. The second definition, which both Friederike Behr and Natalia Leonidovna Kholmogorova agree on, states that political prisoners are people who had a political motive for their actions, and the state convicts them on the basis of political reasons. Have I correctly understood? That it’s not necessary for these two moments to coincide simultaneously. But if so, it is necessary to transfer to this category nearly all militants who bomb, attack and kill, targeting civilians in the North Caucasus, but in general across the country.

Such a broad interpretation leads me to ask a question. I hope Natalia Leonidovna and Friederike can answer it. Friederike said that there where there are political prisoners means that there are problems with the justice system. I’m sorry, but if we define a political prisoner by his personal motives, then what do problems with the justice system have to do with this? A person who carries out crimes for political reasons should probably be in prison. Hopefully this will be indicated in later statements.

I heard in Natalia Leonidovna’s speech the second divergence in our discussion; the classification, let us observe, not of political prisoners, but of prisoners of conscience, as those convicted under the anti-extremist legislation. Of course, probably everyone here considers our anti-extremist legislation to be disgraceful and poorly construed. But can everyone here agree, that all those imprisoned under the anti-extremist legislation may be referred to as prisoners of conscience en masse?

The third divergence which I observed is between two experts of the Human Rights Center “Memorial,” Sergey Davidis and Alexander Cherkasov. It was formulated by Cherkasov. Davidis mentioned that all doubts in the lawfulness of a sentence should be interpreted in the convicted person’s favour, as if starting from the undoubted irregularities in the judgement. From Cherkasov’s point of view, we human rights activists as a result will be constantly forced onto the lawyer’s position. While compiling the lists of political prisoners, and demanding something of the authorities in relation to these people, we completely sympathise with their lawyers. Is it right or wrong, as demanded by Cherkasov, to try and simultaneously understand what kind of man this is after all? Is it possible to refer to him as a political prisoner or as a wrongfully convicted person or not?

In this respect, Zoya Felixovna Svetova made a very interesting and serious proposal for the creation of a council of experts. With the help of such a council, civil society would unite its various forces and try to work out broad concepts and lists on the basis of the examination of cases. Here is my question to you, Zoya. Because of the first three serious divergences in our discussion, a council would also not be able to decide anything without new and clear criteria for forging a common understanding. So far I have not heard proposals for such criteria around our round table. I apologise for having made these observations. I have concluded and declare a break for 12 minutes. We will then hear statements from the audience.

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