Valentin Gefter

VALENTIN GEFTER: A small conclusion to the first part. Of course, we more or less agree on the canonical definition of a “prisoner of conscience.” I’m not going to repeat what was said in the discussion. This term is used in relation to the non-violent defence of one’s rights, publication of one’s views or affiliation to a certain group. It is clear and does not arouse any disputes. There are very few such people at the moment, but if we were to later discuss this in a narrowly qualified sense, we will find a common language.

I could say that Natalia Kholmogorova’s proposals are an extension of our traditional understanding for the last fifteen years in the post-Soviet sphere. The understanding of a politically motivated persecution, as applied to prisoners of conscience. Natalia, I agree with [Alexander] Verhovsky’s arguments, I am not going to repeat them. The idea is the following... Of course, as long as the anti-extremist legislation is not revised. But we don’t agree with you that it must be entirely abolished. We have different views here. But as long as it hasn’t been reviewed, the cases of many of those who are today either judged under the anti-extremist legislation or the same legislation in combination with other articles will demand a thorough examination. But not an automatic enrolment as a prisoner of conscience.

Secondly, you spoke of including the participants of peaceful, non-violent demonstrations. At the moment we have no such articles, thank God, and no one is charging them simply for taking part in demonstrations. Participation in a non-sanctioned event is still considered an administrative offence, rather than a criminal one. But many are imprisoned on charges that have been completely or partially falsified, in relation to these demonstrations. We are also likely to not immediately agree with the recognition of a person as a “prisoner of conscience” in a scenario where he killed a policeman penning him in at a non-sanctioned procession or rally. I believe that such cases like the [Sergey] Mokhnatkin one also require a careful examination, but cannot be automatically decided.

I will summarise the first part. In regards to prisoners of conscience of varying kinds and affiliations, we can in theory already come to an agreement. We can only demand the immediate release of prisoners of conscience. Jumping ahead, I’ll say something about what Zoya Svetova asked; that should have become a persistent demand at the demonstrations and a topic of discussion in the Kremlin. It is what needs to be done right now.

The issue of political prisoners. I will not be repeating our double-key position, which in fact is not only ours, nor did we think of it. It may be found in a resolution by experts of the Council of Europe in 2001 on the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and we discussed it many times. It is a large category of people and it is important to determine the political motives of the authorities in relation to them, which are not just a coincidence, but manifest themselves in specific acts or omissions by the law enforcement and judicial agencies. Only their appearance bears any significance, and not reading into the minds of politicians. It's improbable a politician would admit to giving a direct order for someone's conviction. Only very rarely does this ever happen. Second of all, these are after all the very same violations. The third key, not compulsory but supplementary, helps us allocate someone to the group of political prisoners; they are the motives of these very people, their stances or membership of a political group.

The third point of those which were earlier heard, formally speaking the Davidis-Cherkasov dispute: in whose favour should we interpret our doubts? It seems to me that the accused and the convicted person cannot always be entitled to a presumption of innocence. There are no contradictions here. The issue has needlessly been sharpened. There are no differences here. Of course it is essential from the human right defender's perspective to consider the arguments of the defence, but these are not sufficient grounds for considering a convict as a political prisoner.

Here’s a brief but striking example from the history of our legal system. I travelled with Sergey Adamovich [Kovalyov] to Georgia at the end of the civil war. As a member of the PACE, he was granted the opportunity to meet Georgian prosecutors overseeing criminal cases. At the same time we visited prison cells. Even those where there were prisoners sentenced to life for terrorist acts carried out in the civil war. There was a field and expert mechanism, and we were able to carefully hear from all sides. And now it is this what is completely missing in all cases of people persecuted for political motives. Neither is it found in the legal practice. Of course it cannot be done for thousands of people. But of course it can be done in particularly resonant cases.

I want to say that we are now between two extremes. The first is the excessive politicisation of the issue, as the myriad of lists shows. As a member of the Presidential Council on Human Rights I myself prepared pardon lists, but nothing like the lists falling thick and fast from all sides to near the president's people. Second of all, we don't exactly know if there is some form of a justice system or need to organise donations and offer moral support, as Valery Vasilievich said. We must find a way out of these two extremes. Between the politicisation of the lists and near absence of participation in their compilation we must find a solution in the legal field. Which means we must propose legal mechanisms, and our Council did propose a whole bunch of such mechanisms at the highest level. Changes to the laws on pardon, parole and amnesty, changes to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes, laws reforming the penal system.

Only in conjunction with the adoption of these changes will it be possible to review that list of people whose freedom should be demanded. I am speaking of the prisoners of conscience on the list, as agreed by all the political forces. Only then will it be effective. If every politician will head from a rally or simply run to the president saying such and such people may in his view be freed, and not such and such, that will not lead us anywhere.

I feel it is necessary to add that the issue of Taisya Osipova is an absolutely vicious one. We all fought to soften her fate, I am personally very sorry for her. But it is an outrage when we are publicly told that the president met students at the journalism faculty and instructed the prosecutor’s office. She immediately heard him, ran to the Smolensk regional court and changed the punishment from ten to four years. Not only is this an illegal mechanism, but where the principle of determination of punishment and conviction is indirectly approved. They gave less, and so be it! I wouldn’t want a case to go this way. The judicial system must be changed, removing this illegal field.

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