Sergey Davidis's Remarks

SERGEY DAVIDIS: I’m afraid it will be difficult to provide a full summary of what has been said. Many different things have been said, including some mutually exclusive things. In particular we came across a lack of understanding on competing principles for the presumption of a sentence’s validity and a man’s innocence. I spoke about this but this was not heard; we cannot remove all the risks. We find ourselves in a situation of incomplete information, and we cannot be absolutely sure that someone is not guilty. A court probably aspires to establish the truth in the end. We cannot aspire to establish the truth as we do not have the resources nor the access to information that a court does have. We only claim that as a result of the violations of such and such norms, a reasonable level of guilt has not been established. If we were to have a choice, as to which side we should waver, the best choice would be to defend a guilty person, rather than refusing to defend an innocent one.

My second point is about who should be classified under this procedure and the understanding of “political prisoners.” By mixing their very own ideas, everyone had their own understanding of what a political prisoner is. Bearing in mind one’s own understanding, everyone spoke of how they should be addressed and what to do about them. It’s clear that we hadn’t earlier agreed on some general criteria, as a result of which confusion arose. We spoke about the political motives of the actions of the persecuted individuals. But when talking about political prisoners, we don’t have to speak about innocent ones. The innocent ones are prisoners of conscience. We are speaking about people who maybe are guilty, but their guilt has not been duly established. Or those punished within a case which is clearly unjust, excessively harsh or selective. We are not saying that there is nothing to be examined in the actions of those five people convicted after the events on Manezhnaya square. A small case is there to be answered, but when only five out of fifteen thousand people are convicted on the basis of these charges, this is an example of unacceptable selectivity, which may even be entirely seen as political persecution. They did nothing that the others did not do. Their actions posed no particular threat when compared to those of the others.

Departing from the premise that political prisoners are not necessarily innocent individuals, it is still clear that each case must be studied for proof, procedural violations, judicial selectivity and so on.

At the same time, one approach that was repeatedly brought up stated that all those who have been convicted and persecuted under some of the articles must be considered as prisoners of conscience, and not just political prisoners. We cannot agree to this. Of course there are articles which are exceptionally vague. In my opinion, an odious one is Article 282.2: “Participation in the activities of a banned political organisation.” Perhaps there have been some, but I am not aware of any legitimate cases of conviction under this Article. All of these are cooked up convictions. Former members of the National Bolshevik Party, Hizb ut-Tahrir and other banned organisations are persecuted under this Article. When these people pose no threat to society other than their membership of an organisation, which in itself is a kind of ephemeral factor as this is a former organisation, there is nothing to convict them for but it is very easy to do it. There may also be other kinds of legal violations, but in my view, if a person has been incriminated under one Article, he may be considered not only a political prisoner but a prisoner of conscience. Nonetheless, it is important to review every individual case.

All the other “extremist” articles are so unclearly formulated that it is possible to charge almost anyone under them. But that does not mean that no guilty people have been convicted under them. If we were to define, for instance, the article on “murder” as “the murder of a living being,” then 1000 people would be convicted for having killed a fly, 100 for having killed a cat and 5 for having killed people. Even if the article were a stupid one, would you just free everyone? The article is stupid but so is the approach. We must carefully review each case and at the same time undoubtedly change the Article. When assessing Article 282, it would make sense to demand, for instance, an amnesty for those convicted under it. If people are only convicted under this Article and there are not acts related to violence in their cases, then amnesties and pardons for the named individuals would be required.

Diverse opinions were expressed. We diverge with them to a considerable extent. So what are the prospects for this process? An experts’ council is a somewhat dreamy idea. But we can try and do something that will be recognised all around the Civil Council, one of the emerging protest structures (its prospects are of course also doubted). A working group on political prisoners is formed. In this group it would be suggested that the representatives of various ideological movements unite, that is to say the left, nationalists and liberals, and non-political representatives of civil society. Having united, they could strive to find a form of consensus on this issue and compile a common list of people whom they all recognise as political prisoners. It is probable that someone will not enter the list from various sides. It is impossible to establish a consensus on all of the candidacies. The element of ideological subjectivity is important. However, it is very important to establish common criteria and make a common list, even if it is a small one. I believe this process will now move forward.

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